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Editorial on the Research Topic
Trust: The Limits of HumanMoral
The role of trust in human interaction has been a long-standing question in social sciences, and
the interest has proliferated over the last few decades (Gambetta, 2000; Fukuyama, 1995; Dirks
and Ferrin, 2001; Fehr, 2009). The majority of scientists agree that trust is a necessary ingredient
for almost all functioning human interactions, from love and friendship to economic prosperity
and the emergence of large-scale organizations (Slovic, 1993; Mayer et al., 1995; Fehr and Gächter,
1998; Hetherington, 1998; Fehr and Rockenbach, 2003). Research in psychology, anthropology,
neuroscience, and economics has made tremendous advancements in identifying the psychological
factors that promote trust behavior among humans (Adolphs, 2002; Delgado et al., 2005; King-
Casas et al., 2005; Kosfeld et al., 2005; Williams and Bargh, 2008; Sellaro et al., 2014; Mitkidis
et al., 2015). These findings have inspired the development of interventions that promote effective
interactions and discourage free-riding (Ba et al., 2003; Ariely, 2009, 2016).
Trust is a public good and is based on social intelligence; “... a kind of intelligence that allows
individuals to assess the degree of risk they may face in social situations when confronted with the
possibility of interacting with strangers who might be the path to new and beneficial outcomes.”
(Cook, 2001, xiii). Based on the above, it is obvious that trust is a risky endeavor given the
uncertainty one may face when interacting with others1.
The first section of this special topic issue aspires to examine how people actually behave
in situations of trust and to highlight the psychological and situational factors that foster trust.
The second section aims to unravel some of the socio-cognitive and evolutionary mechanisms
underlying trust and morality.
HOW HUMAN INTERACTION IMPROVES OR DECREASES TRUST
How we can create and maintain positive human interaction has been both a historical question
of the social sciences and a rapidly growing research topic (Lewis and Weigert, 1985; Rand
et al., 2009; Wallot et al., 2016). Given how beneficial trust is in human relationships, it seems
relevant to examine the factors that may increase or decrease trusting behavior and subsequently
enhance cooperation. Trust motivation has been investigated by numerous studies (Yamagishi
and Yamagishi, 1994; Kramer, 1999; Hardin, 2001; Mitkidis et al., 2013), illustrating that
positive interactions with an individual or a group lead to higher trustworthiness and subsequently
1Maybe this is why Bob Dylan is so pessimistic when it comes to trust Dylan (1985).
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cooperation (Fehr and Fischbacher, 2004; Rand et al., 2009).
In the real world, as well as in experiments involving social
dilemmas, people do not always act in a purely selfish manner
but rather display a variety of prosocial behaviors (Ostrom
and Walker, 1991; Fehr and Gächter, 2000; Ariely, 2008). This
raises the question: under which circumstances do we trust each
other?
In this special issue on trust, several studies explored how the
amount and the type of contact affects trusting behavior. Aarøe
et al. demonstrate a negative association between individual’s
pathogen avoidance and social trust level. Håkonsson et al.
examine both the selfish and trust behavior in organizations
where communication is predominantly executed via different
types of media. The authors generate hypotheses about how
the media increase trust behavior in distributed teams. Michael
et al. theorize that a necessary precursor to trusting behavior is a
feeling of a sense of commitment. Andrighetto et al. investigate
the factors other than fear of punishment, reputation, and others’
expectations that can motivate trust. Their results propose that
in the absence of the abovementioned incentives, normative
expectations promote risky behaviors as trust is. Trust is therefore
analogous to answering a very simple question: Can I trust you to
do something? This question is a very practical one and reveals
the essential mechanism behind interpersonal trust: the ability
to predict actions of other people (Gambetta, 2000). Tackling
this line of research, Hommel, and Colzato hypothesize that the
degree of trust among individuals is largely determined by the
degree of interpersonal similarity.
SOCIAL COGNITION OF TRUST
It has become widely accepted that people have cooperative
preferences when taking into consideration the well-being of
the group (Hamilton and Axelrod, 1981; Axelrod, 1984, 2006;
Burton-Chellew and West, 2013; Rand and Nowak, 2013).
Participating in cooperative tasks necessarily depends upon trust
for the accomplishment of collective goals (Bratman, 1992;
Cannon-Bowers and Salas, 2001). Empirically, trust has been
associated with higher economic growth, the emergence of large-
scale organizations, and lower levels of cheating in small-scale
groups and corruption on the aggregate level of larger scale
societies (Arrow, 1972; Putnam, 1993; Fukuyama, 1995; Knack
and Keefer, 1997; Barr, 2003; Guiso et al., 2006; Johnson and
Mislin, 2011). Contrary to the benefits of trust, its pitfalls are
related to immoral behavior and potential corruption (Weisel
and Shalvi, 2015).
Several works examine the link between trust and morality
and the mechanisms underlying those behaviors. Collins et al.
suggest that trust is a cognitive mechanism supplementary to
other mechanisms within the cognitive system. Hochman et al.
suggest that although people have an egoistic side, considerations
that require some kind of social exchange and negotiation
may dominate the self-interested instincts. Espín et al. argue
that since people can stand on both sides of the trust game,
namely act as both trustors and trustees, social preferences may
considerably differ and extent from self-interest to efficiency and
performance considerations. Tan et al. demonstrate that general
system justification, a motivation to sustain the status quo of the
society, is negatively associated with both corruption perception
and corruption intention and that institutional trust plays a
mediating role in these relations. Konis et al. provide insights
into how a perception of immorality of an act differs for multiple
victims in comparison to a single individual. Finally, Heintz et al.
consider trust from an evolutionary perspective and hypothesize
that human cognition evolved mainly for dealing with social life
and despite its risky nature, trust may be advantageous.
CONCLUSION: THE LIMITS OF HUMAN
MORAL
In the course of daily life, people routinely engage in social
exchanges that involve some level of trust. Studies published as
a part of the current research topic suggest that individuals do
not automatically adopt trusting and moral behavior in human
interactions, but that those behaviors are determined by and
modulated by a plethora of cognitive, psychological, situational,
and contextual factors. We believe that research published within
the special topic significantly contributes to understanding of
trust and we encourage further research both on the brighter and
darker sides of trust.
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